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Abstract: 
In  this paper  I discuss  how  different  forms  of  industrial  policy  in  Portugal  are  subjected  to 
different policy risks, and which institutional solutions can be adopted in order to improve the 
effectiveness  and  legitimacy  of  these  forms  of  government  intervention.  Our  analysis 
emphasises  the  differences  between  four  instances  of  industrial  policy  according  to  two 
dimensions: the number of (potential) beneficiaries targeted by the policy and the diversity of 
public agencies in possession of the relevant skills for its implementation. These factors help to 
determine  the  level  of  scrutiny  to  which  public  policies  are  subjected, whether  by  private 
actors or within  the  State apparatus. Both  sources of  scrutiny help  to minimise  the  risks of 
capture of public resources by private  interests and to  foster  institutional  learning processes 
that promote the effectiveness of policies. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper I discuss how different forms of industrial policy1 in Portugal are subjected to 
different policy risks, and which institutional solutions can be adopted in order to improve the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of these forms of government intervention.  
The scope of the academic and policy debate on State intervention in support of specific 
activities has been moving away from arguing about its rationale, to focus on the political and 
institutional conditions that favour the effectiveness and legitimacy of policies (Rodrik, 2008; 
and Chang, 2011). Those conditions aim, in particular, at improving the capacity of civil 
servants and public agencies to design and implement effective policies, as well as reducing the 
risk of capture by interest groups – two common sources of criticism of State intervention in the 
economy, following Krueger (1974). This paper contributes to this change of focus by 
discussing four cases of industrial policy instruments that have been deployed in Portugal in 
recent years: tax benefits for investment of a contractual nature; tax benefits for business R&D; 
direct support for business investment (NSRF incentive schemes); and the Electric Mobility 
Network Program. 
There are three main reasons that make the Portuguese case particularly interesting in the 
present context. 
Firstly, the need to change the profile of productive specialisation is one of the biggest 
challenges facing the Portuguese economy at present (Mamede et al., 2014). In the context of 
the crisis in the Eurozone and the adjustment programme to which Portugal was subjected after 
2011 (EC, 2011), economic policy discussions have been almost exclusively centred on the 
need to correct public finance imbalances, as well as on implementing ‘Washington 
Consensus’-like ‘structural reforms’. However, the industrial structure of the Portuguese 
economy and the slow pace of structural change are the main ingredients of one of the most 
relevant sources of these imbalances – i.e., the low rate of GDP growth in Portugal since the 
turn of the century. In fact, the products and sectors in which the country specialises (using, for 
example, the Balassa index) largely juxtapose the structure of the emerging Asian economies 
and the new, Eastern European EU member states  (OECD, 2007; IMF, 2008). After several 
decades of convergence with the average incomes of OECD countries and the EU, the 
Portuguese economy now operates with production costs that do not allow it to compete based 
on price with those emerging economies. Thus, the acceleration of structural change towards 
activities with greater growth potential and where international competition is less intense, is 
                                                            
1 We follow Rodrik (2008) in defining industrial policy as the set of policy instruments that stimulate specific economic activities 
(including manufacturing, as well as nontraditional agriculture and services) and promote structural change. 
now essential to avoid a permanent loss of the relative living standards of the Portuguese 
population. In fact, this is a problem that affects most countries at the periphery of the 
Eurozone, and which will need to be explicitly tackled in order to find a sustainable path out of 
the present European hurdles (Boyer, 2014). 
Secondly, in spite of the constraints imposed on space of possibilities for public policy in 
Portugal accruing from international institutions such as the WTO and the EU, industrial policy 
does exist in Portugal, taking different forms, some of which are not immediately evident and 
merit a detailed discussion per se. 
Finally, the design and implementation of industrial policy in Portugal as often included 
institutional mechanisms specially conceived to prevent some of the policy risks that are often 
associated with this type of State intervention. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly review the key points in the debate on 
the rationality of industrial policy, discussing the main lessons from several historical 
experiences, as well as their replicability in a country like Portugal at present. In section 3 we 
identify the main challenges facing the Portuguese economy in terms of specialisation patterns, 
and describe a set of policy instruments that are in place with the aim of promoting the 
development of specific activities. In Section 4 we discuss the institutional conditions for a 
legitimate and effective industrial policy in the Portuguese case and how this may differ 
according to the specificities of each policy instrument. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The role and risks of industrial policies in contemporary economies: a brief overview 
The defence of industrial policy as fundamental to economic development is based on the 
notion that private investors are little inclined to make the type of investment that drives 
structural change. Several factors contribute towards explaining this. In general, relevant shifts 
in the productive structure presuppose the development and expansion of activities based on 
knowledge and skills that are scarce in the prevailing situation. Uncertainty regarding the ability 
(technical, commercial, and institutional) to conduct operations related to fundamentally new 
activities, as well as uncertainty regarding the results expected from such investments, are 
strong disincentives to the involvement of private actors in the inception of structural change. 
Such disincentives  are compounded in the case of productive activities that involve huge initial 
investment, given the difficulty faced by most private investors in mobilising huge financial 
resources and the tendency of capital markets to channel resources to low risk investments. 
These characteristics are typical of some activities which are strategically positioned in the 
system of inter-industry relations and which are thus crucial for the development of upstream 
and downstream sectors, or to mobilising the scientific and technological systems for the 
development effort. In the case of more innovative activities (whether technical, commercial or 
institutional), uncertainty about the returns to investment is aggravated by appropriability 
issues:  information (about new products, new processes, new organisational forms, new 
channels of distribution, new markets, etc.) resulting from these activities may be used by 
competitors who benefit from the efforts of pioneers without incurring the same costs. 
To the above listed arguments in favour of industrial policy, opponents typically respond with 
three lines of reasoning. First, they question the relevance of the above mentioned market 
failures as barriers to development. If there are situations in which the functioning of markets 
will not enable the most desirable results in social terms, it is argued, such situations are 
marginal or dealt with through regulatory instruments (for example, the patent system as a 
stimulus to technological innovation). Moreover, it is considered that the diversity and 
sophistication of the information necessary for effective intervention by public authorities in 
these areas is beyond the powers and capacities of public agencies, and therefore industrial 
policy will, in most cases, lead to inefficient and ineffective outcomes. Finally, public support 
for productive activities is seen as particularly prone to being captured by vested interests which 
influence public policy for their own benefit (Krueger, 1974). Ultimately, the argument goes, 
the extension of State intervention in the productive sphere only increases the privileges of the 
most politically influential elites, distorting the functioning of market mechanisms with little 
benefit to society as a whole. 
The confrontation of theoretical arguments between proponents and critics of industrial policy is 
not settled by empirical research. If, on the one hand, case studies abound illustrating the failure 
of public interventions in support of specific activities, on the other hand, there are many 
examples where State support proved crucial to the international success of companies and 
industries (e.g., Chandra, 2006; Chang, 2006; Mazzucato, 2013). The use of econometric 
techniques that try to assess the impact of public support on the performance of sectors is not 
conclusive either. Although many of these studies indicate that the effect of industrial policy on 
the performance of supported activities is not statistically significant (or is even negative), this 
kind of analysis faces methodological problems that are difficult to overcome (Rodrik, 2008).  
In sum, neither the confrontation of theoretical arguments nor the results of empirical studies 
allow for a definitive resolution of the debate about the merit of industrial policies. 
Nevertheless, examples of contemporary economies that abstain from supporting specific 
sectors do not abound. While it is not possible to exclude the presence of other explanatory 
factors behind this fact (State capture by special interests, electoral populism, etc.), the 
widespread diffusion of different forms of industrial policy is at least partly explained by the 
historical experience of countries and/or industries whose economic success has largely 
benefited for different forms of public support. However, various historical analyses have also 
emphasized that the success of industrial policies is often associated with State apparatuses that 
prove conducive to the promotion of policy objectives (e.g., Amsden, 1989; Wade, 2003; Evans, 
1995). This points towards the need to focus not only on the type of policy instruments that may 
promote the need structural changes in each economy, but also of the political and institutional 
conditions that favour the effectiveness and legitimacy of those policies. 
As Rodrik (2007) points out, the idea of the vulnerability of the State to private interests is 
drawn from a conception of human motivation according to which individuals’ instrumental 
interest is the only guide to action. In this line of thought, there are no policy makers motivated 
by the promotion of the common good or State officials who take the public interest and 
professional pride as key references while performing their duties. According to this view, these 
individuals’ actions would only be consistent with the interest of the community if it were 
possible to devise a system of compensations, penalties and controls that ensured the ongoing 
alignment of the common interest with the interests of its representatives. However, since it is 
virtually impossible to ensure the implementation of such a system, it is argued, public policy is 
always associated with the proliferation of corruption, cronyism and the abuse of power.  
This conclusion could not contrast more greatly with the emphasis that is given by Evans (1995) 
and others to the characteristics of bureaucracy (in the Weberian sense of the term) in the 
conduct of successful industrial policies. Recurrently, this type of policy has proved to be more 
favourable to developing economies (such as South Korea, Taiwan and Brazil) when they were 
conducted by competent public agencies loyal to the mission of the State. Notwithstanding the 
specificities of each context, policy options regarding the management of human resources in 
public administration (demanding recruitment policies, continuous training, remuneration and 
career prospects that are competitive with regard to the private sector, etc.) are systematically 
associated with examples in which the State apparatus has been effectively put to work in 
favour of structural change and economic development. 
Regardless of the mechanisms that determine it, the commitment of those responsible for public 
agencies to the collective goals of economic development appears to be essential to overcome 
another problem emphasised by industrial policy critics: the State's inability to access 
information that would be necessary to overcome market failures in the process of structural 
change. 
Historically, in most situations in which the State intervened to promote specific activities, it did 
so in conjunction with private operators. Whether through regulatory activity (aiming to 
encourage or inhibit certain behaviours), through subsidies to private investors, or even through 
direct investment in State-owned enterprises, the success of public policy typically relies on 
mechanisms that foster the proximity between public agents and private actors, in order to elicit 
relevant information about the opportunities and constraints to development, as well as on the 
behaviours that the policy intends to influence (Rodrik, 2007). 
In other words, although the State and the individuals who represent it should keep their 
autonomy with regard to private interests, their action is more effective when it takes advantage 
of the information and experience possessed by agents directly involved in production. As 
Evans (1995) convincingly argues, one of the factors that contributed to the success of industrial 
policy in East Asian countries was the ability to find institutional solutions that ensured an 
'embedded autonomy' of public agencies over private economic actors – i.e. the ability of States 
to maintain a close relationship with the private sector, without being besieged by their interests. 
According to Rodrik (2007), apart from human resource policies in public administration, such 
institutional solutions tend to share the following traits: a clear identification of priorities for 
public intervention, focusing interventions in the most promising sectors; political commitment 
at the highest level  to the strategy of structural change; the assignment of clear mandates for 
public agencies, and their accountability based on results achieved; and the conditionality of 
support on achieving results. 
These elements, as discussed above, are repeatedly mentioned as distinctive characteristics of 
the most successful processes of policy-led development experiences. Overall, they refer to the 
structure of the State's ability to formulate policies and assigning responsibilities for their 
implementation, ensuring the effectiveness and legitimacy of all public interventions. 
However, it is worth noting that the relative importance of each of these elements may vary 
depending on the programmes or public policy instruments in question. Indeed, taken 
individually, the forms of industrial policy entail different risks of State capture by private 
interests, as well as different possibilities for institutional solutions to minimise those risks. In 
this paper I consider four instances of industrial policy in Portugal to illustrate this point. 
 
3. Objectives and instruments of industrial policy in Portugal 
The Portuguese economy is characterised by a high share of low-technology, low value added, 
non-tradable and/or non-market activities (Mamede et al., 2014). Among the tradable sectors, a 
significant proportion of value added and employment is concentrated in labour intensive 
activities. These sectors are particularly exposed to two risk factors of a structural nature: on the 
one hand, they are threatened by stagnant (or even receding) worldwide demand (e.g., Eurostat, 
2013); moreover, they have to face strong competition from emerging economies, which base 
their competitiveness on low production costs (namely, labour compensation) (OECD, 2007; 
IMF, 2008). 
Such a pattern of specialisation is at the root of Portuguese underperformance in international 
trade and in inflows of foreign direct investment – in contrast with the more favourable 
performance of emerging Asian and Eastern European economies. The resulting decrease in the 
share of low-tech industries in the Portuguese economy was compensated for by an increasing 
weight of medium-low-tech industries, while the share of more knowledge-intensive industrial 
activities remained practically unchanged. 
In the years before the international economic crisis of 2008/2009, Portugal recorded some 
positive developments in this field, including the favourable performance of the Technology 
Balance of Payments (whose annual balance turned positive from 2007, due to the good export 
performance activities of technical services – engineering, architecture, computer science, 
among others), as well as the continuing increase in business expenditure in R&D as a 
percentage of GDP. Although these dynamics point towards the desired structural 
transformation of the Portuguese economy, the results in these areas are nonetheless modest 
when compared with those in the more developed economies. Additionally, the recent evolution 
of some indicators shows that the process of structural transformation of the Portuguese 
economy is still fragile. For example, the small surplus of the Technological Balance of 
Payments actually decreased after 2008, while the weight of the high-tech and medium high-
tech goods in Portuguese exports declined, revealing that the successive crises experienced in 
recent years did not penalise less the more advanced sectors of the Portuguese economy. 
Moreover, given the high levels of private indebtedness (which weaken domestic demand), as 
well as the strict budgetary limits imposed by EU rules, future growth will be highly dependent 
on the capacity of the Portuguese economy to generate value from exporting activities – which 
can hardly rely on activities characterised by low knowledge-intensity, low value added, and 
low international demand growth (Mamede et al., 2014). 
In short, the upgrading of its industrial structure has been one of the central challenges facing 
the Portuguese economy since at least the 1990s. It is, therefore, not surprising to find in the 
Portuguese policy landscape a number of instruments and initiatives which were put forward in 
recent decades, aiming (more or less explicitly) at promoting the desirable structural change. 
Next we present four instances of such instruments or projects that help to illustrate this idea – 
and frame the ensuing discussion on the conditions for an effective and legitimate industrial 
policy.2 
 
3.1. Tax benefits for investment of a contractual nature 
The Statute of Tax Benefits establishes the possibility of granting tax exemptions, reduced rates, 
tax deductions and other tax benefits to firms, with the aim of enhancing or inhibiting certain 
behaviours in the public interest. The range of situations under the law is diverse, including: 
various financial investments, investments in productive capacity, corporate restructuring, 
among others. 
In compliance with EU competition rules, the Tax Benefits Statute stipulates that "the definition 
of the objective and subjective conditions for tax benefits must be made in general terms (…) 
only admitting benefits of an individual nature for exceptional reasons duly justified (...)" 
(Article 6). 
The generic formulation of tax benefits does not, however, prevent the Portuguese government 
from actively using them for the promotion of specific activities. Detailed information on all the 
tax benefits granted to companies in Portugal was not made public until recently, and thus a 
comprehensive analysis of its distribution is not viable. Still, it is possible to carry out this 
analysis in the case of two forms of tax incentive for investment that have been actively used in 
Portugal. This subsection deals with the first of these, which regards investment incentives of a 
contractual nature.3 
Tax benefits in Portugal can be granted on a contractual basis to large investment projects 
(equal to or greater than 5 million euros). These are recurrently used in negotiations with 
multinational companies interested in installing production capacity in the country or in 
domestic investment projects which, for different reasons, are eligible for specific public 
support. This type of incentive is legally framed by EU rules, and the associated investments 
must comply with a set of conditions in order to be considered of special national interest. 
According to Portuguese law, such investments must: be relevant to the strategic development 
of the national economy; contribute to the reduction of regional disparities; induce the creation 
or maintenance of jobs; and help to enhance technological innovation and national scientific 
research efforts. Although these conditions to a large extent restrict the scope of activities that 
                                                            
2 The four examples refer to the period that preceded the international crisis of 2008 and especially the Eurozone crisis starting in 
early 2010. This is not incidental: as argued by Mamede et al. (2014), the policy agenda has been almost exclusively focused on 
budgetary, labor market, and regulation policies, largely disregarding other policy domains that may play a relevant role in 
promoting structural change. 
3 In the next section we discuss tax benefits for business R&D. 
are eligible for tax benefits of this type, the industry spectrum of potential beneficiaries is 
nevertheless broad, including the primary sector, manufacturing industries, tourism-related 
activities, IT and R&D services, and various activities in the areas of the environment, energy 
and telecommunications. 
Notwithstanding the above, the analysis of tax credits granted during the period 1999-2008 
shows that these tend to focus on a limited number of industries. Of the approximately 690 
million  euros in tax credits approved in the period (corresponding to 118 investment contracts), 
96% were concentrated in manufacturing, more than half of them in just three industries: pulp 
and paper, chemical, pharmaceutical, and electronics. Although  support directed  at low-tech 
and medium-low tech industries predominates (in addition to pulp and paper, these include the 
oil industry, metallurgy, and foodstuffs), the weight of high-tech and medium high-tech 
industries in the tax credits approved is particularly striking when compared  to the relative 
importance of such sectors in the Portuguese economy. In fact, the more technology-intensive 
industries account for 4% of value added and 1% of Portuguese companies, but they take in 2/5 
of such tax credits.  
 
Figure 1 - Share of industry groups in the total number of firms, value added and investment tax credits of a 
contractual nature (1999-2008) 
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The intention of fostering those industries that do not correspond to the traditional comparative 
advantages of Portugal is visible in the share of tax credits approved for major investment 
projects in electronic, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, but also in the automobile and 
automobile components industries (e.g., engineering, rubber and plastics), reflecting the priority 
attached by policy-makers to the promotion of the automotive cluster in Portugal. 
 
3.2. Tax benefits for business R&D 
The intention of stimulating the development of activities with little weight in the Portuguese 
productive structure is even clearer in the case of the System of Tax Incentives for Business 
R&D (SIFIDE). 
Introduced in Portugal in May 1997, the SIFIDE allows for the tax deduction of business 
expenditure on R&D (classified according to the OECD Frascati Manual). In a country where 
business expenditure on R&D is relatively low and limited to a small number of firms4, the 
impact of instruments like SIFIDE is necessarily selective and asymmetrically distributed across 
industries. Of the approximately 222 million euros of tax incentives granted under SIFIDE 
between 2006 and 2008, nearly half were concentrated in six industries, which represent 9% of 
GDP and 1% of domestic companies. 
 
Table 1 - Sectors that benefit most from SIFIDE (2006-2008) and its weight in the economy 
Industry Tax credit in 2006/08 (€) 
% of total tax 
credits 
% of GVA in 
2008 
% firms in 
2008 
 Software consultant and related activities 30.209.458 14% 1% 1% 
 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical 
products and pharmaceutical preparations 20.775.113 9% 0% 0% 
 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, 
semi-trailers and components for motor 
vehicles 
16.563.852 7% 1% 0% 
Telecommunications 13.897.690 6% 4% 0% 
 Manufacture of computer, 
communications equipment and 
electronic and optical products 
12.151.431 5% 0% 0% 
Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral products 9.980.104 4% 2% 0% 
Total (of the listed industries) 103.577.648 47% 9% 1% 
Sources: Certification Commission of Tax Incentives for Business R&D (2010) and INE 
 
Some of the industries that benefit the most from SIFIDE were also among the biggest 
beneficiaries of the tax incentives scheme discussed in the previous subsection (including 
pharmaceuticals, automotive and related components, and electronic products). However, in the 
case of SIFIDE, IT services (which tend to be absent in the case of tax incentives for large 
                                                            
4 According to official estimates, about 1,800 firms reported R&D expenditure in 2010. 
investments, due to their strongly immaterial nature) and telecommunications activities 
(traditionally very active in business R&D in the country) are outstanding beneficiaries. The 
high public support  for all the aforementioned industries is also to be found in other programs 
and instruments of public policy in Portugal, such as  those discussed below. 
 
3.3. Direct support for business investment (NSRF incentive schemes) 
In the past two decades, direct support for firm investment in Portugal was strongly associated 
with the Cohesion Policy of the EU, the main source of finance for such policy instruments. In 
the first three programming periods of Structural Funds (1988-1993, 1994-1999 and 2000-
2006), these direct incentives were relatively little selective in nature, supporting nearly every 
form of business investment in almost all industries (Augusto Mateus & Associados, 2005). 
Recognising the urgent need for structural change in the Portuguese economy, and reflecting the 
recommendations resulting from the evaluation of the previous programmes, the National 
Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) that ran in the period 2007-2013 substantially reformed 
the incentives schemes for business investment co-financed by the EU Cohesion Policy. Such 
reforms led, among other things, to a more focused approach, both in terms of number of 
projects and types of investment. In particular,  priority was given to supporting projects related 
to: business R&D; product or process innovation; expansion of production capacity in sectors 
with high technological content or dynamic international demand; knowledge-based 
entrepreneurship; and the use by SMEs of intangible competitiveness factors (organisation and 
management, design, product and process development and engineering, digital economy, 
fashion and design, internationalisation, and qualification of human resources). 
As before, the new incentives schemes allowed, in principle, for supporting investments in 
almost all productive activities (being conditioned only to primary activities, construction and 
financial services). However, their implementation was biased in favour of activities aligned 
with the goal of structural change. As in the case of tax benefits for investment of a contractual 
nature, manufacturing was the main beneficiary here, absorbing 2/3 of the roughly €2.3 billion 
of incentives approved (while its weight in terms of VAB was close to 20%). More technology-
intensive manufacturing industries absorbed a proportion of incentives that was five times 
greater than its share of value added.  
 
Figure 2 - Industries that benefit most from the incentive schemes for business investment NSRF 
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The incentives granted to non-knowledge intensive services focus heavily on tourism – an 
industry in which Portugal has an intermediate level of specialisation and which is targeted by 
different national policy instruments. 
 
3.4. Mobi.E - Electric Mobility Network Programme 
The three examples above refer to policy instruments that are apparently ‘horizontal’ in nature 
but the implementation of which reveals a preferred orientation towards specific sectors. By 
contrast, the last case discussed here is a programme that deliberately took a sector specific 
focus from the outset. 
The prospect of replacing vehicles using petroleum products with electric vehicles has huge 
potential – not only economic, but also political and environmental – especially for countries 
heavily dependent on imported oil and where electricity generation is done with little use of 
fossil fuels. Growing use of electric vehicles reduces the need for oil imports, with beneficial 
effects on the trade balance, as well as in terms of security of energy supply. In addition, electric 
vehicles help to make better use of renewable energy by providing a storage form for the energy 
produced at night (when the level of energy consumption tends to be low). Finally, the large-
scale diffusion of electric vehicles would significantly reduce CO2 emissions, contributing to 
meeting the targets set by international rulings, as well as improving environmental quality. 
Electric vehicles are thus a powerful attraction for a country like Portugal: heavily dependent on 
imported fossil fuels, with worrying imbalances in the current account, and with an ambitious 
programme of renewable energy. 
However, the generalisation of electric vehicles as an alternative paradigm to the combustion 
engine faces several hurdles. In general, the persistent uncertainty as to its economic viability 
discourages investment both on the part of producers and consumers. A major factor of 
uncertainty is the evolution of technology related to batteries: at present, the autonomy of an 
electric car is highly limited, putting the electric vehicle at a distinct disadvantage against a car 
moved by petrol or diesel. 
Internationally there have been ad hoc solutions that aim to minimise this disadvantage. A well-
known case was the solution developed by the Californian firm Better Place, which was initially 
implemented in Israel5. The firm’s solution was based on the principle of battery replacement, 
through a vast network of replacement stations. Notwithstanding the advantages of this system – 
it ensured the desired autonomy of vehicles, and the initial investment was guaranteed by the 
private company – it contains a number of drawbacks, the most relevant of which is the huge 
initial investment required (which greatly reduces the prospects of competition in the market for 
battery replacements). 
An alternative proposal was presented to the Portuguese government by Inteli – a semi-public 
think tank. The system proposed by Inteli was based on a network of charging stations, thereby 
ensuring interoperability between the network of electrical mobility and the various brands and 
systems for charging batteries of electric vehicles. It also had the advantage of incorporating a 
higher content of domestic production. 
Intel promoted the formation of a consortium that included three leading national companies in 
IT services, electro-mechanics, and electricity, to develop what would become the Mobi.E 
project. This project consisted of installing a network of electric charging stations distributed 
throughout the country, with a global management system of energy flows and related financial 
transactions. This is essentially a non-proprietary system – it ensures the separation of 
ownership of charging stations, electricity distribution and energy supply services – and has as a 
distinctive feature the underlying business model for the management of energy and financial 
flows in the system. As in the management of ATM networks, Mobi.E’s charging stations are 
all alike in the eyes of users, regardless of the operator who owns them. In particular, this 
system allows different companies to offer their commercial packages of energy supply – price 
lists, discount schemes, etc. – without consumers being forced to fill up at specific loading 
stations. This in turn presupposes the existence of a compensation system that distributes the 
revenues among the various actors. 
                                                            
5 Better Place went bankrupt in 2013. See, e.g., http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/another‐clean‐tech‐
startup‐goes‐down‐better‐place‐is‐bankrupt/276257/. 
For the companies involved in the consortium, this project was not only a source of revenue but 
also an opportunity to develop and test pioneering products with promising international 
demand. For the software companies involved the electric mobility network presented great 
potential for the development of sophisticated IT systems (e.g., smart electrical network 
management interfaces, information networks, communication between the network, consumers 
and charging stations), which will probably be in high demand in the near future. For companies 
producing electronic equipment, the pilot project was an opportunity to develop solutions for 
charging stations that incorporate not only energy supply solutions but, more importantly, 
electronic systems for satellite communications. For the electricity company involved, the 
development and implementation of Mobi.E constituted a learning moment in the development 
of the business model to adopt in the future as a supplier of energy for electric vehicles. 
The Portuguese government provided initial financial support for Mobi.E through a public fund. 
The State’s action was also visible in the regulatory domain, classifying legal entities and the 
governance of the network, and setting the rules during the trial period – which, in practice, 
granted the consortium the monopoly of the process throughout 2011. Other measures included: 
the creation of tax incentives and subsidies for the purchase of electric cars, the renewal of 
public bodies’ car fleets and the adoption of municipal regulations in favour of using electric 
vehicles in cities (e.g., preferential parking areas); promoting research networks linked to the 
theme; the creation of incentives for the involvement of national industry in developing 
solutions for charging batteries and construction of electric vehicles;  attracting major 
manufacturers of electric vehicles and components;  and the concerted action of  Portuguese 
economic diplomacy in promoting Mobi.E. The growing visibility of the Portuguese electric 
mobility project attracted international interest, opening up business opportunities for 
companies, as well as contributing to the involvement of large multinational companies and 
major research centres in international projects associated with Mobi.E. 
As the Euro Area crisis developed and a newly elected government took office in 2011, 
Portugal focused on the implementation of the austerity programme agreed with official 
creditors and the electrical mobility project was strongly downgraded. Nonetheless, the Mobi.E 
consortium reoriented its activities towards the external market, selling abroad the technological 
solutions developed in the context of this project. 
 
4. Conditions for an effective and legitimate Industrial Policy in Portugal 
As seen earlier, critics of industrial policy point to the inability of the State apparatus to access 
the relevant information, together with its vulnerability to capture by special interests, as factors 
that determine the undesirability of industrial policy. While these risks are present in various 
forms of State intervention in the economy, analysis of various historical examples suggests that 
scepticism regarding industrial policy based on these risks should itself be critically assessed. 
The comparison between the four cases of industrial policy in Portugal referred to in the 
previous section – tax benefits for investment of a contractual nature, tax incentives for business 
R&D, direct incentives for business investment, and the electric mobility network programme – 
help to illustrate this idea. These cases show significant differences in two dimensions: (i) the 
volume of private beneficiaries of public support (which is associated with a more or less 
recurrent nature of such support), and (ii) the dispersal of relevant skills among the public 
agencies that are responsible for policy design, implementation and monitoring. The following 
table compares the four types of intervention in the light of these dimensions.  
  Table 2 - Volume of private beneficiaries 
  high Low 
Dispersion of relevant 
skills in public 
administration 
High 
Direct incentives (grants and 
loans) for business investment (SI 
NSRF) 
Tax benefits for investment of a 
contractual nature (BFINC) 
Low System of tax incentives for business R&D (SIFIDE) 
Electric mobility network 
program (Mobi.E) 
 
The direct incentive schemes for business investment (SI NSRF) and the system of tax 
incentives for business R&D (SIFIDE) have in common the fact that they target a large number 
of companies. In the case of SI NSRF, between late 2007 and mid-2010, over three thousand 
companies received public support for investment projects; in the case of SIFIDE, more than 
600 companies received tax incentives in 2008 alone. While these figures represent a small 
percentage of the firms operating in the relevant period (reflecting a significant degree of 
selectivity of support), they contrast with the volume of companies supported under the 
investment tax benefits of a contractual nature (BFINC) – an annual average of about 12 
companies between 1999 and 2008 – and with the programme of electrical mobility (Mobi.E) 
(where the number of companies directly involved is reduced to the low tens). 
The size of the set of enterprises receiving public support in each case is not irrelevant to the 
risks of State capture by vested interests and to the possible institutional responses to those 
risks. On the one hand, a large number of recipients – and an even larger number of potential 
beneficiaries – necessarily implies a greater scrutiny of public policies by civil society, 
particularly with regard to the former’s efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy. The beneficiary 
companies tend to question the procedures for allocation of support, and those companies to 
which support was denied tend to question the selection criteria and decision mechanisms. The 
public agencies and policy makers involved in the management of these policies are therefore 
more often exposed to diffused public pressure, and they often respond to that pressure by 
making an effort to clarify the policy objectives and justify the institutional arrangements 
associated with policy implementation. 
Additionally, the high number of beneficiaries appears typically associated with a higher 
recurrence of support. In fact, SI NSRF and SIFIDE are expected to be in place in a medium-
term horizon and are based on recurrent processes of project analysis and decision, requiring 
significant volumes of dedicated human resources. The repetition of implementation procedures 
is conducive to institutional learning among the public agencies involved, strengthening the 
criteria and mechanisms for evaluating and selecting projects. 
While both SI NSRF and SIFIDE target a broad spectrum of beneficiaries, the two instruments 
differ with respect to the distribution among public agencies of the skills that are relevant for 
policy implementation. Being a policy instrument co-financed by EU structural funds, the 
planning and management of SI NSRF necessarily involve the institutional structure provided 
for in the regulations of European cohesion policy – from the managing authorities of 
operational programmes, to the fund coordinating and certification bodies, and auditing 
authorities. Additionally, since direct incentive schemes target various types of firm (industry, 
size, etc.) and projects, the capacity to examine the appropriateness and adequacy of 
applications is necessarily distributed among various public agencies that are not necessarily 
linked to the management and supervision of European structural funds. Moreover, the 
European funds constitute a significant source of funding for policies pursued by these national 
public agencies. This, together with the fact that they possess the relevant skills to implement SI 
NSRF, creates strong incentives for the relevant public agencies to get involved in the design 
and management of support mechanisms. This means that this policy instrument is subjected not 
only to strong external scrutiny (due to the volume of beneficiaries, as discussed above) but also 
to processes of interaction and consultation involving various government bodies. By contrast, 
the number of institutional actors involved in SIFIDE is necessarily smaller, due to its specific 
domain (business R&D) and the fact it is unrelated to European funds. 
The dispersion of skills relevant to the implementation of public policies is also present, albeit 
to a lesser extent, in the case of tax benefits for investment of a contractual nature (BFINC). As 
discussed above, this policy instrument is deployed in complex negotiations with large investors 
(often foreign), covering policy domains as vast as taxation, international trade, licensing, 
training, R&D, among others. Typically, different public agencies are called upon to comment 
on specific aspects of the investment contracts under negotiation, introducing some elements of 
scrutiny within the public administration. However, in contrast to the SI NSRF, not only is the 
diversity of public agencies involved more limited (it often excludes, for example, entities 
linked to the management, control and audit of European structural funds), its intervention is of 
a sporadic nature, limiting the potential for inter-institutional learning and scrutiny. 
Finally, in the case of Mobi.E, as seen above, the number of both private beneficiaries and 
public agencies involved is limited. As a result, it tends to be subject to scrutiny both within and 
outside the State apparatus. 
In short, the differences between various forms of industrial policy – as regards the dispersion 
of relevant skills in public administration and the volume of beneficiaries – carry different risks 
of State capture by special interests, which are inversely proportional to the internal and public 
scrutiny to which they are subjected in a democratic society. Such differences are also 
associated with different institutional solutions for minimising the risks of different State 
capture by private interests, as suggested in the following table.  
 
Table 3 - Institutional solutions for reducing the risks of State capture by special interests 
  Volume of private beneficiaries 
  High Low 
Dispersion of relevant 
skills in public 
administration 
High 
Generic explanation of the priorities of public 
policy. Involvement of different public 
agencies relevant to the processes of design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation, 
with a range of political tutelage. Publication of 
the recipients, the amounts of support and the 
criteria adopted (not necessarily decision-
making processes).   
Detailed explanation of the priorities of public 
policy. Involvement of different public 
agencies in implementing relevant policies. 
Publication of the recipients, the amounts of 
support, the criteria adopted and the decision 
processes. Need for control mechanisms 
outside the executive branch of State 
(parliamentary and public audit). 
Low 
Detailed explanation of the priorities of public 
policy. Publication of the recipients, the 
amounts of support, the criteria adopted and the 
decision processes. Relevance of assessment 
processes unrelated to policy implementation. 
Setting objectives and cessation clauses of 
public support. Need for control mechanisms 
outside the executive branch of State 
(parliamentary and public audit) and 
independent evaluation processes for the 
implementation of policies. 
  
 
As argued above, when policy instruments target a high volume of beneficiaries and several 
public agencies are involved in their implementation, the potential conditions for a high level of 
scrutiny are in place. Thus, minimising the risk of capture can be achieved by: firstly, 
publicising the list of private beneficiaries, the amounts of support granted, and the selection 
criteria applied; and secondly, ensuring the involvement of various relevant public agencies 
throughout the policy lifecycle (design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). Such 
extended scrutiny helps to reduce the risk of illegitimate use of public resources and to enhance 
the effectiveness of policies, without significant introduction of external control mechanisms. 
Insofar as the mechanisms of mutual scrutiny between the various public agencies are 
guaranteed, keeping the decision processes opaque to external observers can, paradoxically, 
function as a protecting device from pressure by special interest groups, without compromising 
the legitimacy of these processes. 
Where opportunities for scrutiny of public policy are lower – either because the relevant skills 
for its implementation are concentrated in a limited number of public agencies, or because the 
number of beneficiaries is reduced – the minimisation of risks of State capture by private 
interests tends to require additional mechanisms for evaluation and control. Typically, the 
involvement of a limited number of agencies in implementing the policies implies the need for 
further independent evaluation processes. The latter can operate both as opportunities for 
improvement of policies and as protection of public agencies against external illegitimate 
pressure. In turn, when opportunities for scrutiny are reduced as a result of the limited number 
of beneficiaries (de facto and potential), improved mechanisms of formal control (including 
parliamentary scrutiny and public audit) and stricter conditions regarding the amounts and terms 
of support (e.g., sunset clauses) may be necessary, given the closeness of the interactions 
between public agencies and private actors that tends to characterise the intervention in question 
(leading to higher risks of State capture by special interests). 
 
5. Conclusions 
The discussion of State intervention in support of specific activities has been experiencing a 
change of focus in recent years, falling away from the rationale of industrial policies to focus on 
the political and institutional conditions that promote the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 
policies pursued. 
Based on the historical analysis of a set of successful (and less successful) cases in which the 
State played an active role in supporting structural change, several factors have been identified 
that promote the effectiveness and legitimacy of industrial policies, such as: human resource 
management practices in public administration that promote the quality of interventions and the 
autonomy of civil servants;  identifying clear priorities for public intervention, focusing 
interventions on the most promising activities; political commitment at the highest level with 
the strategy of promoting structural change; the allocation of clear mandates to the public 
agencies involved and their accountability based on performance; and the conditionality of 
support on achieving results (Rodrik, 2007). 
These factors tend to be presented in the literature in a general way, identifying the least 
common denominator of successful cases of industrial policies. In this paper we analyse in 
greater detail the conditions for effective and legitimate industrial policies, examining four cases 
of public interventions in Portugal. Our analysis emphasises the differences between the various 
interventions according to two dimensions: the number of (potential) beneficiaries targeted by 
the policy and the diversity of public agencies in possession of relevant skills for managing the 
interventions. These factors help to determine the level of scrutiny to which public policies are 
subjected, whether by private actors or within the State apparatus. Both sources of scrutiny help 
to minimise the risk of capture of public resources by private interests and to foster institutional 
learning processes that promote the effectiveness of policies. 
Overall, the analysis developed here suggests that: (i) where the nature of the policies favours 
internal or external scrutiny, the effectiveness and legitimacy of industrial policy can benefit 
from pursuing such possibilities of enhancing scrutiny, (ii) when the interventions are, by their 
nature, little exposed to scrutiny by the beneficiaries or by different public agencies, alternative 
mechanisms for monitoring, independent audits and policy evaluations should be put in place to 
minimise the risk of capture of public resources by private interests and to encourage learning 
processes leading to more effective interventions. 
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